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NOTES

Promises of Leniency: Whether
Companies Should Self-Disclose
Violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
ABSTRACT

Over the last ten years, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
has prosecuted an increasing number of Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) violations, imposing larger and larger
penalties. In fiscal year 2010, the Criminal Division of the DOJ
imposed $1 billion in penalties as a result of violations of the
FCPA, the largest in FCPA enforcement history.
Most FCPA enforcement actions are brought against
corporations for conduct that American law enforcement
agencies have difficulty detecting because it occurs outside of the
United States. As a result, the DOJ encourages companies to
voluntarily disclose FCPA violations, claiming that it will take
a more lenient approach to FCPA prosecutions that are selfreported and reward "disclosureand genuine cooperation."
Despite these promises, practitioners and academics have
questioned whether a company that voluntarily discloses a
potential FCPA violation actually receives a lesser fine than a
company whose illegal conduct is discovered by a government
investigation. With the likelihood of detection by the DOJ very
low and the costs of disclosure very high, these questions have
led to suggestions that companies are better off keeping mum.
This Note argues that the available evidence about previous
FCPA settlements suggests that companies are likely rewarded
for their candorand cooperation.
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WHETHER TO SELF-DISCLOSE FCPA VIOLA TIONS

I. INTRODUCTION
41.
In
or
about
August
2002,
an
employee
of the
Subcontractor ... delivered a pilot's briefcase containing one million
U.S. dollars in one hundred dollar bills to the [Nigerian National
Petroleum Company (NNPC)] Official at a hotel in Abuja, Nigeria, for
the benefit uf a political party in Nigeria.

43.
In
or
about
April
2003,
an
employee
of
the
Subcontractor... delivered a vehicle containing Nigerian currency
valued at approximately $333,333 to the hotel of the NNPC Official in
Abuja, Nigeria, for the benefit of a political party in Nigeria.

46. Between on or about April 1, 2002, and on or about January 12,
2004, employees, agents, and co-conspirators of Snamprogetti willfully
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, and caused
the commission of FCPA violations by KBR... by aiding and abetting
KBR in causing wire transfers of $39.8 million... intending that the
money would be used, in whole or in part, to pay bribes to Nigerian
1
government officials.

On July 7, 2010, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., a Dutch
engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) company,
admitted in a deferred prosecution agreement filed in U.S. federal
district court that it had violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) by causing the pilot's briefcase and the vehicle filled with
money to be delivered to a Nigerian government official. 2 For nearly
ten years, Snamprogetti had conspired with three other EPC
companies to bribe Nigerian officials in order to obtain contractsworth more than $6 billion-to build liquefied natural gas facilities
on Bonny Island, Nigeria. 3 As a result of this conduct, Snamprogetti

1.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 34-36, United States v. Snamprogetti
Neth. B.V., No. 4:10-cr-00460 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2010) [hereinafter Snamprogetti
Deferred Prosecution Agreement]; accord Deferred Prosecution Agreement app. A at
40-41, United States v. Technip S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010)
[hereinafter Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (containing the same statement
concerning the briefcase and the vehicle).
2.
Snamprogetti Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, at 23, 34-36.
3.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V.
Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million
Criminal Penalty (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/
10-crm-780.html.
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and the three other companies agreed to pay hundreds of millions of
4
dollars in criminal penalties.
In the world of white-collar crime prosecution, stories and
settlement agreements like Snamprogetti's are not rare.5 The FCPA
prohibits a company or individual from bribing a foreign government
official to influence an official act, induce unlawful action, or obtain or
retain business. 6 The number of FCPA cases prosecuted by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has been increasing over the past ten
years, as have the size of the criminal penalties levied against
violators.7 In fiscal year 2010, the Criminal Division of the DOJ
8
imposed $1 billion in penalties as a result of violations of the FCPA.
This was the largest in FCPA enforcement history and half of the
total penalties secured as a result of all enforcement actions led by
9
the Criminal Division that year.
Most FCPA enforcement actions are brought against
corporations for conduct that occurs outside of the United States.O
This conduct is often difficult for American law enforcement agencies
to detect, and as a result, the DOJ encourages companies to
voluntarily disclose the discovery of potential FCPA violations." The
DOJ claims to take a more lenient approach to FCPA prosecutions
when the conduct is self-reported and to reward "disclosure and
genuine cooperation. 1 2 The DOJ, however, has not issued standards

4.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7, United States v. JGC Corp., No.
4:11-CR-00260 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter JGC Deferred Prosecution
Agreement]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 3.
5.
See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act-1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 89, 90 (2010) ("After decades of obscurity,
the FCPA now occupies center stage in the federal government's war on white-collar
crime.").
6.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006); Bixby, supra note 5, at 93-94.
7.
Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 389, 415-16 (2010).
8.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Secures More
than $2 Billion in Judgments and Settlements as a Result of Enforcement Actions Led
by the Criminal Division (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opal
pr/201 /January/11-crm-085.html.
9.
Id.
10.
See ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL
LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS 162 (2010) (noting that FCPA
investigations and interviews should take place in the foreign country where the
conduct occurred); Evan P. Lestelle, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International
Norms of Foreign Public Bribery, and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,83 TUL. L. REV.
527, 538 (noting the transnational nature of FCPA proceedings).
ii.
STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 675 (2d ed. 2010) ("U.S. enforcement officials strongly
encourage self-reporting or disclosure by individuals and entities.").
12.
Bixby, supra note 5, at 115.
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or policies that specifically address how voluntary disclosure will be
13
treated during the sentencing process.
Despite these promises, practitioners and academics have
questioned whether a company that voluntarily discloses a potential
FCPA violation actually receives a lesser fine than a company whose
14
illegal conduct is discovered by a government investigation.
Moreover, self-disclosure can cost a company more than just a civil or
criminal penalty. The FCPA is often considered a cash cow for Big
Law firms, and disclosure-by the company or otherwise--can result
in significant legal expenses for outside counsel, wide-ranging
internal investigations, and new compliance programs. 15 The low
likelihood of being caught coupled with the significant secondary
expenses and the perception that self-disclosure does not
meaningfully decrease criminal penalties has led to the suggestion
that companies are better off cleaning shop and keeping mum about
16
potential FCPA problems.
This Note addresses the question of whether companies that
voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations are treated more
leniently by the DOJ than companies that do not. This question
matters to companies not only because the answer will impact their
financial interests, but also because collateral consequences often
accompany the disclosure of illegal conduct. 17 This question also
matters to prosecutors because if violators no longer believe it is in
their interest to disclose FCPA violations, fewer companies will come
forward, making it harder to enforce the FCPA.
Specifically, this Note addresses the question of whether
voluntary disclosure leads to more lenient treatment by aggregating
the publicly available data about corporate FCPA prosecutions
resolved by the DOJ between 2002 and 2011 and then identifying
emerging trends and discussing relevant case studies. Part II
provides background information about the FCPA, describing the
agreements used by the DOJ to resolve FCPA cases and explaining
how FCPA fines are determined. Part II also describes the DOJ's

13.
Michael Volkov, To Disclose or Not Disclose: That Is the Question, FCPA
BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011, 7:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/2/2/to-disclose-or-not.
disclose-that-is-the-question.html.
14.
Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: DisproportionateFines in Recent
FCPA Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 397 (2010);
Volkov, supra note 13.
15.
See Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts Business and
Enriches Insiders, FORBES, May 24, 2010, at 70 (arguing that government attorneys
are "creating a lucrative industry-FCPA defense work-in which they will someday be
prime candidates for the cushy assignments").
16.
See Hinchey, supra note 14, at 398 (noting that in some cases "voluntary
disclosure involves significant risks that may be less likely to be presented if the
company simply responds .. . to FCPA issues internally").
17.
TARUN, supra note 10, at 182 (stating the disadvantages of voluntary
disclosure in FCPA cases).
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policy regarding voluntary disclosure in FCPA cases. Part III details
the methods used to aggregate data about FCPA settlements, as well
as the limitations of those methods, and presents the relevant data.
Part IV qualitatively describes the data and identifies emerging
trends and presents three case studies. While the question of whether
voluntary disclosure leads to more lenient treatment cannot be
answered definitively by the information presented here, the
emerging trends and case studies this Note identifies suggest that
failing to disclose forecloses the possibility of receiving the most
lenient treatment.

II. BACKGROUND

Passed in the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress enacted
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 to stop the bribery
of foreign officials and "to restore public confidence in the integrity of
the American business system."18 As the result of a Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation in the 1970s, over four
hundred American companies ultimately admitted to making these
types of payments, which totaled over $300 million. 19 Congress
responded by passing the FCPA, which makes it unlawful to pay
20
bribes to foreign government officials to obtain or retain business.
A. Foreign CorruptPracticesAct: Elements of the Offense
The FCPA consists of two sets of provisions: the anti-bribery
provisions and the books and records and internal control
provisions. 21 While violations of the anti-bribery provisions are more
commonly enforced, the DOJ has increased its use of the books and
22
records provisions in the last ten years.

18.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

PERSON'S GUIDE TO THE
LAY PERSON'S GUIDE],

FCPA (2011)
available at

http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraudlfcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf;
see also H.R.
REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101 ("In our free market system it is basic that the sale of
products should take place on the basis of price, quality, and service. Corporate bribery
is fundamentally destructive of this basic tenet.").
19.
H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 ("More than 400 corporations have admitted
making questionable or illegal payments. The companies, most of them voluntarily,
have reported paying out well in excess of $300 million in corporate funds to foreign
government officials, politicians, and political parties."); Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing
International CorruptPracticesLaw, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 129, 134 (2010).
20.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006); Carrington, supra note 19, at 134.
21.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (books and records and internal control provisions); id.
§§ 78dd-1 to -3 (anti-bribery provisions); Koehler, supra note 7, at 389.
22.
See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST 93 (2012), available at
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/fcpa-digest.pdf (noting that Siemens AG's guilty
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Anti-Bribery Provision

The anti-bribery provision prohibits those subject to the statute
from "corruptly paying or offering 'any thing of value' to a 'foreign
official' in order to 'obtain or retain business.' '23 The FCPA applies to
both U.S. and foreign companies and nationals, and the DOJ
regularly prosecutes both for violating the statute. 24 The FCPA does
not define "anything of value," the legislative history does not provide
a clear definition of this element, 25 and the DOJ has not provided
formal guidance. 26 However, DOJ enforcement actions provide facts
about the "things of value" at issue in those cases. Those things of
value have ranged from payments that were under $100 but were
numerous and frequent to payments of millions of dollars. 27 In
addition, things of value have also ranged from cash-filled briefcases
and vehicles 28 to travel expenses that were not related to the business
29
of the company that was paying for them.

plea in December 2008 was the first time the DOJ had charged a company with
criminal violations of the internal controls or books and records provisions); see, e.g.,
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1-2, United States v. Magyar Telekom, PLC, No. 111-cr-00597 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Magyar Telekom Deferred
Prosecution Agreement] (deferring prosecution of Magyar Telekom for violations of the
anti-bribery and books and records provisions); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 23, United States v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 3:11-cr-00329-JM (Jan. 31, 2011)
[hereinafter Maxwell Techs. Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (deferring prosecution of
Maxwell Technologies for violations of the anti-bribery and books and records
provisions); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, app. A, at 3, United States v.
Daimler AG, No. 1:10-cr-00063-RJL (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Daimler AG
Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (deferring prosecution of Daimler AG for violations of
the anti-bribery and books and records provisions).
23.
Koehler, supra note 7, at 394; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
24.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd.l(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a); Koehler, supra note 7, at 390;
Natalya Shnitser, Note, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC and
Private Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 1638, 1680 (2010) (noting
that the FCPA has been used against multinational companies, including foreign
issuers cross listed in the United States). The FCPA applies to foreign corporations
that list shares on a stock exchange located in the United States or are otherwise
required to file reports with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006) (applying the FCPA's
prohibitions to issuers who register securities pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act).
25.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(h), 78dd-2(h), 78dd-3(h); H.R. REP. No. 95-640 (1977);
S. REP. No. 95-114 , reprinted in 1977 U.S.CC.A.N. 4098; Koehler, supra note 7, at
390.
26.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY PERSON'S GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3
(stating only that the FCPA prohibits "paying [or] offering.., anything of value").
27.
See, e.g., Information
at 24-27, United
States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (detailing the various
ways in which Siemens made improper payments violating the FCPA).
28.
Information at 17-18, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. H09-071 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009) [hereinafter KBR Information] (identifying the delivery
of cash-filled briefcases and vehicles as things of value under the FCPA).
29.
See, e.g., Letter from Dennis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Daniel J. Horwitz, Counsel for Comverse Tech., Inc. app. B (Apr. 6, 2011)
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A "foreign official" is defined in the FCPA statute as:
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf
of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or
30
for or on behalf of any such public international organization.

It is not controversial that this definition covers foreign heads of
state, elected foreign government officials, and employees of foreign
government agencies that are analogous to the U.S. Department of
Treasury or Department of State. 31 The FCPA's legislative history
also indicates that Congress intended to prohibit payments to these
32
kinds of individuals when it enacted the FCPA.
Recent enforcement actions, however, have expanded this
understanding of foreign official. The majority of FCPA enforcement
actions brought in 2009 identified employees of state-owned or statecontrolled enterprises as foreign officials under the theory that their
employers are an "instrumentality" of a foreign government. 33 The
DOJ has also made statements indicating a broader understanding of
foreign official. 34 For example, in November 2009, Lanny Breuer, the
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the DOJ, told
a pharmaceutical industry audience that "doctors, pharmacists, lab
technicians and other health professionals who are employed by
state-owned facilities" would be considered foreign officials for
purposes of the FCPA.35 Several federal district courts have also
36
recently upheld this broader definition of foreign official.

[hereinafter Comverse Non-Prosecution Agreement], availableat http://www.justice.gov/
criminalfraudfcpacases/rae-comverse/04-06-1lcomverse-npa.pdf (identifying payment
of non-business-related travel expenses as things of value under the FCPA).
30.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2006).
31.
Koehler, supra note 7, at 391.
32.
H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (arguing that legislation was needed
because American companies had admitted to bribing "high foreign officials in order to
secure some type of favorable action by a foreign government"); H.R. REP. No. 94-831,
at 13 (1977) (noting that the House amended the bill to define "foreign official" as "any
officer of a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof,
or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such government,
department, agency or instrumentality"); Koehler, supra note 7, at 391.
33.
See, e.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. Control Components, Inc., No.
8:09-cr-00162 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2009) [hereinafter CCI Plea Agreement]; Koehler,
supra note 7, at 391-92.
34.
See Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official
Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1255 (2008) (quoting Mark F. Mendelsohn, Remarks at
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Conference: FCPA: Complying &
Implementing Risk Strategies (Nov. 9, 2007) (audio recording on file with The Business
Lawyer)) (quoting the Deputy Chief of the DOJ's Fraud Section as saying that "all
employees of public entities" are foreign officials).
35.
Lanny Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Keynote Address at the Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance
Congress and
Best
Practices
Forum
(Nov.
12,
2009),
available at
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The thing of value must be given to the foreign official in order to
"obtain or retain business," which the FCPA statute defines as:
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any
act in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official, or (iii)
securing any improper advantage; or (13)
inducing such foreign official
to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining
37
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.

The DOJ has stated that it will interpret this element broadly so that
the term includes more than simply awarding or renewing a contract
and does not require that business be done with the foreign
government. 38 In the most recent Court of Appeals decision to
address this issue, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the term "obtain or
retain business" in United States v. Kay to include payments reducing
customs or taxes that create an unfair advantage and assist the payer
in obtaining and retaining business. 39
The FCPA also prohibits indirect payments to government
officials. Those subject to the FCPA may not provide anything of
value to any person while knowing that all or a portion of the value
will be given, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to obtain or
retain business. 40 This element is satisfied when an individual has
actual knowledge or "a firm belief that such circumstance exists or
that such result is substantially certain to occur" or "isaware of a
high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the
'4 1
person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist.
2.

Books and Records and Internal Control Provisions

The second half of the FCPA deals with a company's books and
records and internal controls. These provisions apply to entities that
have a "class of securities" registered pursuant to the securities laws
or are otherwise "required to file reports" pursuant to the securities

http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/ 1-12-O9breuerpharmaspeech.pdf.
36.
See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (finding that an employee of a state-owned company was a foreign official under
the FCPA); United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at
*11 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (finding that an employee of a state-owned company may
be a foreign official under the FCPA, though the government would have to present
sufficient evidence at trial that the company was an instrumentality of the state).
37.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
38.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY PERSON'S GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3-5.
39.
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir. 2004).
40.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3).
41.
Id. § 78dd-3(t)(3)(A)(ii)-(B).
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laws. 42 These entities are called issuers and primarily consist of
publicly held companies that are traded on a U.S. stock exchange and
foreign companies that are listed on a U.S. stock exchange. 43 Under
the books and records provision, issuers are required to "make and
keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer. '44 Finally, the FCPA requires, through its
internal controls provision, that issuers "devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances" that (1) management has authorized all transactions and
(2) transactions are recorded so that financial statements can be
45
prepared and assets accounted for.
B. Enforcement of the FCPA
The FCPA is both a civil and a criminal statute. 46 The DOJ is
responsible for all criminal enforcement of the FCPA and for civil
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to domestic
concerns and foreign companies and nationals. 47 The SEC is
responsible for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with
respect to issuers. 48 While the DOJ's "Lay Person's Guide" to the
FCPA states that "[c]onduct that violates the anti-bribery provisions
of the FCPA may also give rise to a private cause of action for treble
damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), or to actions under other federal or state laws," nearly all
49
FCPA-related actions have been brought by the DOJ or the SEC.
This Note focuses on criminal enforcement of the FCPA because the
50
DOJ has encouraged voluntary disclosure in exchange for leniency.
1.

Vehicles for Enforcement:
Non-Prosecution Agreements,
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, and Plea Agreements

Enforcement actions brought by the DOJ against companies
usually come in the form of a non-prosecution agreement or a

42.
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B)(2).
43.
Koehler, supra note 7, at 395.
44.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
45.
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
46.
Id. § 78dd.
47.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY PERSON'S GUIDE, supranote 18, at 2.
48.
Id.; Koehler, supra note 7,at 395-96.
49.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY PERSON'S GUIDE, supra note 18, at 6.
50.
See Breuer, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that companies that voluntarily
disclose will receive a "meaningful credit" in return).
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deferred prosecution agreement. 51 In a non-prosecution agreement,
the Department agrees not to prosecute the company for its wrongful
conduct, usually in exchange for a monetary penalty and changes to
the company's compliance policies. 5 2 In a deferred prosecution
agreement, the Department agrees to defer prosecution, and often
withholds it completely, as long as the company pays a monetary
penalty, enhances its compliance measures, and does not violate the
53
law during the deferral period.
The DOJ frequently opts for this middle ground between
indicting a company and bringing no action, using "diversion" or
"deferral" agreements to sanction companies that violate the FCPA.54
The concept of diversion or deferral agreements is borrowed from the
prosecution of individuals-usually juveniles or first-time offenderswho are given the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves without the
stigma of prosecution. 55 In the FCPA context, these agreements most
often come in the form of a deferred prosecution agreement or a nonprosecution agreement. 56 While these agreements have no standard
form, they usually impose on the defendant company a combination of
the following conditions: (1) an internal investigation; (2) a code of
conduct or a compliance program to "prevent or deter violations of the
law"; (3) acceptance of responsibility by the corporation; (4) provision
of specified information to the government with "full candor and
completeness"; (5) waivers of attorney-client and work product
privilege; (6) dismissal of employees involved in the misconduct; (7) a
continuing duty to cooperate; (8) payment of restitution and/or a fine;
and (9) probation with the use of continuing monitors whose duties
depend on the remedial measures required of the defendant
57
company.
These types of agreements benefit companies by allowing them
to avoid the severe collateral consequences of indictment. 58 In order
to comply with this kind of agreement, thereby receiving the benefit
of the probationary period, a company usually has to enact
substantial internal reforms and cooperate with the government,

51.
David C. Weiss, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, SEC Disgorgement of
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality,
Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 471, 478-79 (2009).

52.
Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the New 'Regulators'- Current
Trends in Deferred ProsecutionAgreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 163-64 (2008).
53.
Id.
54.
See, e.g., id. (defining deferral agreements); Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and
Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 451 (2010) (defining diversion agreements).
55.
Spivack & Raman, supra note 52, at 163.
56.
Id. at 160; Thomas, supra note 54, at 452.
57.
Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the
Corporationin Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 47 (2010).
58.
Id.

568

VANDERBILTiOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45:557

"effectively helping prosecutors build a case against individual
employees.159 Companies also must often make restitution payments
and submit to federal monitoring. 60 If, at the end of the deferral
period, the government is satisfied that the company has fulfilled the
obligations of the deferred prosecution agreement or non-prosecution
agreement, the prosecutor will drop the charges.6 1 If the company
fails to comply with the agreement, the government reserves the right
to prosecute the company for the alleged conduct that served as the
basis for the deferred prosecution agreement or non-prosecution
agreement. 62 In that scenario, the company's conviction is "virtually a
'63
foregone conclusion.
The collapse of Arthur Andersen LLP, Enron's accounting firm,
highlighted the need to do something in between charging and not
charging a corporate defendant.6 4 Even though Arthur Andersen's
conviction was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court, the
eighty-nine-year-old accounting firm went out of business as a result
of the initial indictment. 65 Because of Arthur Andersen's collapse and
the other repercussions of Enron's collapse, "the DOJ no longer sees
its role in the corporate context as solely that of indicting,
prosecuting, and punishing. Instead it is a vehicle effecting
widespread structural reform within corrupt corporate cultures."66
The DOJ formalized this view-and responded to the collapse of
Arthur Anderson-by issuing a memorandum in early 2003 entitled
"Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations." 67 The
memo, authored by then-Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Thompson, superseded a memorandum written by the previous
Deputy Attorney General, Eric Holder, outlining the various factors
prosecutors could consider in deciding whether to proceed against a
company with criminal charges. 68 The Thompson Memo, however,
added to the Holder Memo by emphasizing that "[t]he main focus of
[its] revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the
authenticity of a corporation's cooperation" with government

59.
Spivack & Raman, supranote 52, at 160.
60.
Id.
Id. at 160-61.
61.
Id. at 161.
62.
63.
Id. at 161 n.9 (quoting Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal
Div., Remarks to the ABA White Collar Crime Luncheon (Feb. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/2005/march/O3-09-O5wrayremarks-dc.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64.
See Thomas, supra note 54, at 453 (discussing the extreme repercussions of
the indictment of Arthur Andersen).
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 454.
67.
Spivack & Raman, supra note 52, at 166.
68.
Id.
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investigators and prosecutors. 69 The Holder Memo did not specifically
mention deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements, 70 and
the Thompson Memo added the option of "pretrial diversion" as a
reward for a company's cooperation, formalizing the DOJ's
recognition of an alternative to the "all-or-nothing choice between
indicting
(and destroying) a company and giving it a complete
'pass."' 71 Since then, the use of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements has burgeoned, 72 and by 2008 these
agreements had become an "essential component of FCPA
'73
enforcement.
2.

Penalties in the Statute

The FCPA imposes criminal sanctions on both individuals and
corporations. Corporations and other business entities are subject to a
fine of up to $2 million; officers, directors, stockholders, employees,
and agents are subject to a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment
of up to five years for violating the FCPA.74 Under the Alternative
Fines Act, penalties for violating the FCPA can be much higher-up
to twice the benefit that the defendant sought to obtain by making
the corrupt payment. 75 Individuals or companies that are found guilty
of violating the FCPA may also be barred from doing business with
the federal government.76
3.

Guidance from the Sentencing Guidelines

The number of FCPA prosecutions and the size of criminal
penalties imposed on violators have increased substantially. 7 7 For
example, in 2002 the DOJ prosecuted one corporation, Syncor

69.
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of
Dep't Components, U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo], available
at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm; see Spivack & Raman,
supra note 52, at 166 (noting that the Thompson Memo and Holder Memo shared a lot
in common, but the Thompson Memo added a few "significant" lines).
70.
Spivack & Raman, supra note 52, at 166. See generally Memorandum from
Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys (June 6,
1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], available at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
... reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF.
71.
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, CorporateCriminal Prosecution in a
Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1095, 1103 (2006). See generally Thompson Memo, supra note 69.
72.
Spivack & Raman, supra note 52, at 166.
73.
Thomas, supra note 54, at 454.
74.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd.l(g), 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(g); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY-

PERSON'S GUIDE, supra note 18,at 5.
75.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY-PERSON'S GUIDE, supra note 18, at 5.

76.
77.

Id.
Bixby, supra note 5, at 104-06.
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Taiwan, Inc., and imposed a $2 million fine on the company.7 8 In
contrast, the DOJ entered into twenty-one settlements in 2010 and
eleven in 2011, 79 with fines ranging from $1.2 million8" to $400
million. 8 1
The Sentencing Guidelines established by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission provide guidelines to determine what penalty a
defendant should receive for illegal conduct.8 2 The Guidelines provide
a formula that takes into account various factors about the defendant
and the crime in order to come up with a sentencing range.8 3 The
Guidelines specify a base offense level that applies to all FCPA
violations, but it can be increased by specific characteristics of the
conduct at issue.8 4 When the defendant is a corporation, the
Sentencing Guidelines require that sentences be calculated using the
greatest of (1) the value of the unlawful payment; (2) the value of the
benefit received or to be received in return for the unlawful payment;
or (3) the consequential damages resulting from the unlawful
85
payment.
After determining the base offense level, the range of possible
sentences is determined by calculating the defendant's culpability
score.8 6 The culpability score for a corporate defendant in an FCPA
case is determined using the formula in § 8C2.5,87 which includes the
following factors: the size of the organization (number of employees);
the level of responsibility that the individuals who participated in,
condoned, or willfully ignored the offense had; prior history of
criminal conduct; whether the criminal conduct violated a judicial
order; whether the organization willfully obstructed or impeded (or
attempted to obstruct or impede) the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the offense; whether the company had an effective
compliance and ethics program; whether the organization
unreasonably delayed reporting the offense to the appropriate
governmental authorities; whether the employees responsible for the

78.
Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No. 02-1244svw (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Syncor Plea Agreement].
79.
See infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
80.
See Comverse Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 29, at 3 (imposing a
fine of $1.2 million).
81.
See United States' Sentencing Memorandum at 16, United States v. BAE
Sys. PLC, No. 1:10-cr-035(JDB) (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2010) [hereinafter BAE Sentencing
Memo] (imposing a fine of $400 million).
82.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1(d)(1) (2011); see also
NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA SUN BEALE & SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 181,
421 (5th ed. 2010) (describing the effects that changes to the Sentencing Guidelines
have had on white-collar prosecution and plea-bargaining).
83.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1.

84.
85.
86.

Id. § 2C1.1(b).
Id. § 2Cl.1(d)(1).
ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 82, at 971-74.

87.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5.
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compliance and ethics program reported directly to management,
reported the offense before it was discovered outside the organization,
promptly reported the offense to appropriate governmental
authorities, and no one with operational responsibility participated in
the offense; and whether the company self-reported, cooperated in the
investigation, and demonstrated acceptance of responsibility." s
The base offense level and the culpability score determine the
range of possible monetary penalties. 89 While the Guidelines were
originally mandatory, after United States v. Booker they only serve as
a starting point and are advisory. 90 Many FCPA plea agreements,
deferred prosecution agreements, and non-prosecution agreements
contain a calculation of the Guidelines range, including the base
offense level, base fine, and culpability score, as well as a narrative
explanation of the factors that influenced the defendant's applicable
fine range. 9 1 These sentencing calculations presumably serve as a
starting point for the monetary penalty eventually imposed on
92
corporate FCPA defendants.
4.

Ever-Increasing Enforcement

While the DOJ and SEC have long brought enforcement actions
against companies and individuals who violated the FCPA, the
number of enforcement actions has increased significantly over the
past ten years. 93 Between 1978 and 2000, the DOJ and SEC brought
an average of three FCPA prosecutions per year, but between 2003
and 2009, they brought an average of five FCPA prosecutions per
year and investigated an average of twenty cases per year. 94 In
addition, some consider the enforcement efforts during the past
decade to be both more far-reaching and more aggressive. As
Professor Mike Koehler wrote in 2010, "[i]f the increase in FCPA
enforcement over the last decade has taught anything, it is that all
companies, in all industries, doing business in all countries face
FCPA risk and exposure." 95

88.

Id. § 8C2.5(b).

89.
Id. § 8C2.6.
90.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding the
Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory rather than mandatory).
91.
See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 8-11, United States v. ABB
Ltd., No. H-10-665 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter ABB Deferred Prosecution
Agreement] (containing the calculation methods for determining the Guidelines range
and a narrative explanation of influential factors).
92.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.7(a) (explaining how the
minimum of the Guidelines fine range is determined).
93.
Weiss, supra note 51, at 482.
94.
Id.; infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
95.
Koehler, supranote 7, at 396.
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Practitioners and scholars have attributed this upswing in FCPA
enforcement to several different factors, primarily more aggressive
tactics by the DOJ and the SEC and the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act. 96 Since 2004, the DOJ has hired new attorneys in the
Criminal Division's Fraud Section who focus solely on FCPA cases,
and the SEC has also hired hundreds of new employees to work on
corporate compliance cases. 97 In addition, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, which investigates violations of the FCPA with the
DOJ, created a new unit in 2007 dedicated to conducting only FCPA
investigations. 98 During this time period, the DOJ also began
utilizing novel theories of liability to prevent corporations from
avoiding prosecution under the FCPA.99 Finally, DOJ officials have
publicly stated that FCPA enforcement is a priority. 10 0 Mark F.
Mendelsohn, the then-Deputy Chief of the DOJ's Fraud Section said
in 2008 that anti-corruption cases had become "a significant priority
in recent years." 1 1 Mr. Mendelsohn, who was responsible for FCPA
prosecutions at the time, further noted that "U.S. companies that are
paying bribes to foreign officials are undermining government
'102
institutions around the world. It is a hugely destabilizing force.'
Some have credited the increase in FCPA prosecutions during
the last ten years to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was passed by
Congress in 2002.103 Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in the wake of the4
10
collapse of Enron to prevent similar situations from reoccurring.
The Act has two main provisions: requirements regarding corporate
codes of ethics and requirements mandating reporting procedures for

Bixby, supra note 5, at 115-16; Laura E. Kress, How the Sarbanes-Oxley
96.
Act HasKnocked the "SOX" Off the DOJ and SEC and Kept the FCPA on Its Feet, 10 U.
Pir. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 2 (2009) (arguing that the recent surge in FCPA enforcement
"is in part a result of the enactment of the SOX").
97.
Bixby, supra note 5, at 104.
98.
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., Prepared Address to
the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/11-1709aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf; Bixby, supra note 5, at 104.
99.
Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, a Little More Action:
Evaluating and Forecastingthe Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under
the ForeignCorrupt PracticesAct, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 285 (2007).
Dan Slater, And the FCPA Party Continues .... WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Sept.
100.
12, 2008, 9:19 AM), http:/blogs.wsj.comllaw/2008/09/12/and-the-fcpa-party-continues
(reporting statements made by Fraud Section officials).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006)); Bixby, supra note 5, at 116; Robert
Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO
L. REv. 703, 705 (2007).
104.
Bixby, supra note 5, at 116; Prentice, supra note 103, at 705.
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public companies.1 0 5 The, corporate reporting provisions require that
corporate accounting records be completely accurate and that the
CEO and CFO of publicly held corporations publicly certify all
financial statements.10 6 These individuals must certify that the
company's periodic reports contain no "material misstatement or
omissions and 'fairly present' the firm's financial condition and
results of operations."'10 7 Additionally, CEOs and CFOs must affirm
that they (1) are responsible for internal controls; (2) have designed
the controls to ensure that material information is brought to their
attention; (3) have evaluated the effectiveness of the internal
controls; (4) have presented in the report their conclusions about the
effectiveness of the controls; and (5) have discussed in the report any
changes in the internal controls, including any corrective actions.1 08
Officers who knowingly certify inaccurate financial statements are
subject to criminal penalties under § 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. 10 9 Management's report must be attested to by the external
auditor assessing the reliability of the company's internal financial
controls and filed with the SEC. 110 These more stringent internal
controls and reporting requirements have made it possible-and more
likely-that a company will discover violations of the FCPA and need
to take action regarding those violations in order to make the
certifications required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 11 '
C. Sleeping with the Enemy: Cooperation in
CorporateFCPA Prosecutions
The reporting and compliance requirements imposed on
companies by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also dramatically increased the
number of FCPA cases that were reported to the DOJ and SEC by the
violators
themselves. 112
Because
Sarbanes-Oxley
requires
corporations to look more closely at their own compliance with federal
113
laws such as the FCPA, they are more likely to discover violations.
In turn, those same corporations are also more likely to disclose those

105.
15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006); Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of
Corporate Compliance in the United States: A Brief Overview, in ADVANCED CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS WORKSHOP 73, 98 (Michael E. Horowitz et al. eds., 2009).
106.
15 U.S.C. § 7241; Bixby, supra note 5, at 116.
107. Prentice, supra note 103, at 705; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
108.
15 U.S.C. § 7241(a); Prentice, supra note 103, at 705-06.
109.
18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2006); Prentice, supra note 103, at 706.
110.
15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2006); Prentice, supra note 103, at 706.
111. Bixby, supra note 5, at 116-17.
112. Karen T. Cascini & Alan DelFavero, An Assessment of the Impact of the
Sarbanes-OxleyAct on the Investigating Violations of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,
6 J. Bus. & ECON. RES. 21, 25-26 (2008).
113.
Id. at 25.
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violations to enforcement agencies because Sarbanes-Oxley also
1 14
imposes reporting requirements on them.
However, while the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements may be
pushing companies in the direction of disclosing, the consequences of
self-reporting are both real and significant. 115 Although the DOJ has
both officially and unofficially issued statements and policies
intended to induce disclosure, the significant fines that have been
levied against companies that self-disclosed have led many to ask
whether the DOJ is truly sincere when it says-formally and
informally-that companies who self-disclose will be rewarded with
116
lesser punishments.
1.

DOJ Policy Regarding Self-Disclosure

The first rumblings of an official DOJ policy to reward disclosure
and cooperation were heard in the Holder Memo's mention of
amnesty or immunity. 1 7 However, the Holder Memo defined
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and willingness to cooperate in
DOJ investigations to include "the waiver of the corporate attorneyclient and work product privileges."' 1s The Thompson Memo, issued
by the DOJ in 2003, made the principles in the Holder Memo official
DOJ policy for prosecutors and applicable in all corporate
prosecutions.i 1 9 This created an atmosphere in which officers of
corporations believed that they could only avoid indictment by
cooperating fully and waiving the attorney-client and work product
privileges.' 20 In 2004, the policy of rewarding waiver was also
incorporated in the Sentencing Guidelines. 1 1 The commentary to §
8C2.5 was amended to include the comment that "waiver of attorneyclient privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite
to a reduction in culpability score ... unless such waiver is necessary

in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent
information known to the organization."'122 This transformed the

114. Id.
115.
DEMING, supra note 11, at 675.
116.
Volkov, supra note 13.
117.
Don R. Berthiaume, "Just the Facts": Solving the Corporate Privilege
Waiver Dilemma, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 2 (2010). See generally Holder Memo, supra note
70.
118.
Holder Memo, supra note 70, at 3; Berthiaume, supra note 117, at 2.
119.
Berthiaume, supra note 117, at 2. See generally Thompson Memo, supra
note 69.
120.
Berthiaume, supra note 117, at 2.
121.
Id.
122.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 cmt. 12 (2004); Berthiaume,
supra note 117, at 2. This commentary was later repealed. Id.; see infra note 125 and
accompanying text (describing changes in the DOJ's cooperation policy).
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waiver of privilege from merely a consideration in the charging
123
decision to a part of a court's sentencing calculation.
In 2006, the McNulty Memo updated the Thompson Memo to
placate critics of the DOJ's policy of disclosure and waiver. 124 This
policy had been criticized for tipping the scales too far in favor of the
DOJ, and court decisions, a bill introduced but not passed by
Congress, and the Sentencing Commission's repeal of the
commentary it had added to § 8C2.5 in 2004 highlighted these
concerns. 125 The McNulty Memo attempted to provide safeguards by
requiring that prosecutors have a legitimate need for the privileged
information and seek permission from higher authorities before
requesting
privileged
material
from
corporations
under
investigation. 126 The most recent policy on this topic, the Filip Memo,
was issued in August 2008.127 This memo included a more concise
cooperation policy:
The government's key measure of cooperation must remain the same as
it does for an individual: has the party timely disclosed the relevant
facts about the putative misconduct? That is the operative question in
assigning cooperation credit for the disclosure of information-not
whether the corporation discloses attorney-client or work product
materials. 128

The Filip Memo also incorporated these policies directly into the
United States Attorney Manual and remains the most recent DOJ
129
policy regarding corporate voluntary disclosure.
2.

DOJ Promises Regarding Self-Disclosure

In addition to official DOJ policies meant to induce selfdisclosure of corporate criminal conduct, representatives of the
Criminal Division and the Fraud Section-the offices responsible for
prosecuting violations of the FCPA-have also made public

123.
Berthiaume, supra note 117, at 2.
124.
Id.
125.
United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008); Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007); Berthiaume, supra
note 117, at 2.
126.
Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components, U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/
2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf; Berthiaume, supra note 117, at 2.
127.
Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components and U.S. Att'ys on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Aug. 28,
2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo], available at www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dagmemo-08282008.pdf; Berthiaume, supra note 117, at 3.
128.
Filip Memo, supra note 127, at 13.
129.
Id. at 1; Berthiaume, supra note 117, at 3; see UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S
MANUAL § 9-28.0000 (2008) (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations).
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leniency

in

on the FCPA in

October 2006, then-Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division Alice Fisher said, "[I]f you are doing the things you should be
doing-whether it is self-policing, self-reporting, conducting proactive
risk assessments, improving your controls and procedures, training
on the FCPA, or cooperating with an investigation after it starts-you

will get a benefit." 130 Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division Lanny Breuer also said that voluntary disclosure would be
appropriately rewarded during an address at the National Forum on
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in November 2009,131 and in May
2010 then-Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler said that

companies which had been promised credit would receive that credit
for voluntary disclosures and remedial actions. 132 More recently,
Charles Duross, the Fraud Section Deputy Chief with responsibility
for FCPA prosecutions, told attendees of the World Bribery &
Corruption Compliance Forum in September 2010 that with regard to
voluntary disclosure, the DOJ "has and will continue to provide
meaningful credit for companies that provide voluntary disclosures,"
and just this month a Fraud Section official mentioned the benefits of
voluntary disclosure at Georgetown University Law Center's annual
133
Corporate Counsel Institute.
3.

Recent Controversies About Whether to Self-Disclose

Despite the official DOJ policies and unofficial DOJ promises
that companies which voluntarily disclose will be rewarded with

130.
Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared
Remarks at the American Bar Association National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/
speech/2006/10-16-06AAGFCPASpeech.pdf.
131.
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., Prepared Address to
the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/11-1709aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf.
132.
Gary G. Grindler, Acting Att'y Gen., Address at the 2010 Compliance Week
Conference (May 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2010/dagspeech- 100525.html.
133.
Jenna Greene, Agency Officials Say Feds Remain Committed to FCPA
Enforcement, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Mar. 8, 2012, 3:30 PM),
http://Iegaltimes.typepad.comblt/2012/03/agency-officials-say-feds-remain-committedto-fcpa-enforcement.html (reporting on statements made by DOJ and SEC officials
related to FCPA enforcement); Mike Koehler, World Bribery & Corruption Compliance
Forum-Comments by U.S. Officials, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/world-bribery-corruption-compliance-forum-commentsby-u-s-officials (reporting on comments made by DOJ and SEC officials during a panel
discussion on voluntary disclosure at the World Bribery & Corruption Compliance
Forum).
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leniency and credit when investigations into their FCPA violations
are resolved, many in the FCPA defense bar question the premise
that self-disclosing companies receive lesser penalties than companies
that do not disclose. 134 The DOJ has not issued standards or policies
that specifically address how a voluntary disclosure will be treated
13 5
during the sentencing process.
Additionally, most companies do not decide whether to selfdisclose based on the assumption that they will be caught if they do
not self-disclose. In many situations, the likelihood that conduct
violating the FCPA will be discovered is very low. 1 36 A company can
137
fix the problem and reasonably believe it will never be discovered.
Moreover, the costs of self-disclosure--especially when the conduct
would not otherwise be detected-are not limited to penalties
imposed by the government. The DOJ frequently requires cooperation
from the defendant corporation as well as changes to the corporation's
compliance program. 138 This can often require engaging outside
counsel to conduct tremendously expensive and far-reaching internal
investigations and developing and implementing new compliance
programs. In many situations, companies consider the likelihood of
getting caught, the cost of cooperating with the government, and the
potential for a criminal fine when deciding whether to self-disclose,
not just the likelihood that the DOJ will live up to its promise of a
lesser fine for self-disclosing.
This Note addresses these concerns by surveying the publicly
available information about previous FCPA settlements. To
determine whether the DOJ rewards self-disclosure with leniency,
Part III aggregates data related to the corporate FCPA cases that
were resolved between 2002 and 2011 and analyzes that data to
identify emerging trends and helpful case studies.

III. DOJ ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, 2002-20 11
Between 2002 and 2011, the DOJ entered into over seventy
agreements to resolve FCPA prosecutions. 139 While deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements do not have to be filed

134.
Hinchey, supranote 14, at 401-05; Volkov, supra note 13.
135.
Volkov, supra note 13.
136.
Id.
Id.
137.
138.
See, e.g., Hinchey supra note 134, at 432 (discussing the DOJ's requirement
that corporate defendant CCI implement a compliance program).
139.
See infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4 (listing all dispositions that occurred
during this time period). The DOJ sometimes enters into separate agreements with a
parent company and its subsidiaries, so even though multiple dispositions have been
reached, only one entity has been prosecuted.
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with a court, 140 most recent FCPA settlements have been filed in
federal district court, and the Criminal Division's Fraud Section has
made available on its website all FCPA enforcement actions brought
by the DOJ from 1998 to the present. 14 1 Included on the website are
the agreements between the DOJ and the defendant company, press
releases issued by the DOJ about the settlements, and any other
documents filed with the court, such as criminal informations,
142
sentencing memoranda, or motions for reduced sentences.
A settlement agreement between the DOJ and an FCPA
defendant constitutes the complete agreement relating to the conduct
at issue 143 and contains the terms of the agreement, including the
charges, the amount of the penalty, and any other remedial measures
required of the defendant. 144 The agreement also contains a
Statement of Facts, which both the DOJ and the defendant agree is
"true and accurate,"' 145 describing the conduct underlying the
agreement. In addition, many recent agreements also include the
sentencing calculation, under the appropriate Guidelines, used to
determine the monetary penalty imposed on the defendant. 14 6 These
documents comprise the universe *of publicly available information
about the FCPA cases prosecuted against corporate defendants by the
DOJ in the past decade, and all of the information surveyed in this
Note came from these documents.
A. Methodology
This Note first aggregates the available data about the following
aspects of an FCPA settlement between a corporation and the DOJ:
type of disposition; amount of the criminal penalty; penalty range as
determined by the Sentencing Guidelines; amount of bribes or
improper payments; amount of profit or benefit derived from the
improper payments; and whether the defendant voluntarily disclosed

140.
See Spivack & Raman, supra note 52, at 180-81 (noting that some
agreements have never been made public); F. Joseph Warin & Andrew S. Boutros,
Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A View From the Trenches and a Proposal for
Reform, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 121, 122 n.4 (2007) (noting that many deferred
prosecution agreements are not court-filed).
DEP'T
JUST.,
141.
FCPA
and
Related
Enforcement
Actions,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
142.
Id.
143.
See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 22, United States v.
Transocean, Inc, No. 10-768 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Transocean Deferred
Prosecution Agreement] (noting that the deferred prosecution agreement sets forth the
complete terms of the agreement).
144.
See, e.g., id. at 11-12 (terms of the agreement).
145.
See, e.g., id. app. B (statement of the facts).
146.
See, e.g., ABB Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 91, at 8-11
(laying out the sentencing calculation under the Guidelines for the case).
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the illegal conduct to the DOJ. 14 7 Using the available data, this Note
then identifies in Part IV.A emerging enforcement trends.
Within the available data, this Note focuses on two areas: the
Guidelines calculation of monetary penalties and the amount of
benefit or profit derived by the company as a result of its corrupt
payments. To examine the first area, this Note collects the available
information about how disclosure and cooperation influenced
Guidelines calculations and ultimate sentences. As discussed in Part
I.B.3, a prosecutor may decrease the culpability score used in the
Guidelines calculation due to the defendant's disclosure and
cooperation, and a prosecutor also recommends a specific monetary
penalty, given the range of available penalties determined by the
Guidelines. 148 Although some settlements did not include a
Guidelines calculation, 149 the data collected is still valuable because
the fine range is determined by the amount of profit derived from the
illegal conduct, which is often available, and deviating from the fine
150
range is the easiest way for prosecutors to exercise discretion.
Additionally, because this information tracks what the DOJ has
actually done in previous settlements, it is likely to have predictive
value for future settlements.
This Note also tracks the amount of benefit or profit derived by a
company from its corrupt payments. This amount relates to the
penalty imposed on a company that violates the FCPA in several
ways. First, the Alternative Fines Act allows the monetary penalty
for a violation of the FCPA to be twice the benefit that the defendant
sought to obtain by making the corrupt payment.' 5 ' This amount is
often used in sentencing because it is often higher than the FCPA
statutory maximum of $2 million. 15 2 Second, as described in Part
II.B.2, the amount of benefit derived from the improper payments is
used to calculate the base offense level under the Guidelines. 153 While
the benefit or profit derived by the defendant company does not
determine the criminal penalty that will ultimately be levied, it
154
serves as a starting point for calculating a criminal fine.
Tracking the amount of the fine and the amount of profit or
benefit can also show whether the DOJ is rewarding companies that

147.
See infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4 (aggregating data of settlements both
involving disclosure and not involving disclosure).
148.
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the prosecutor's discretion to decrease the
culpability score and recommend monetary penalties).
149.
See supra Part II.B (noting some calculations do not include the Guidelines
calculations)
150.

151.
152.
153.
154.
levels).

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4 (2011).

See supra Part.II.B.2 (detailing the Alternative Fines Act).
See supra Part.II.B.2.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1. 1 (2011).
See id. (providing base levels and factors that warrant an increase in those
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voluntarily disclose conduct or cooperate with the investigation by
imposing a lesser fine. Because similar benefits or profits should
result in similar base fines, differences in the penalties ultimately
imposed must be due to other factors. Some have criticized the use of
profits and fines to compare cases because the amount of profit
derived from improper payments is difficult to calculate and not
easily available. 15 5 However, most FCPA settlements include the
benefit to the company, either as a specific monetary amount or a
possible range of profits, in the documents filed in court. 156 The
obvious alternative, the amount of the bribes paid, is equally difficult
to calculate. 15 7 Moreover, the amount of profit derived from illegal
activity is also used to determine the penalties levied against
158
companies that commit securities fraud.
While this Note seeks to identify some order in the morass of
FCPA settlements, the number of cases which have been settled and
the amount of information available about those cases limits the
conclusions that one can draw from this information. Because the
DOJ only publicizes cases that are resolved by a written agreement
between the DOJ and the defendant company, information about
cases the DOJ declines entirely is not readily available and may not
be publicly available. 159 The number of cases is also small and the
number of cases that provide a complete set of data is even smaller.
This data set is too small for meaningful statistical analysis, and
other studies to evaluate consistency and fairness in sentencing have
been exponentially larger.
However, this Note contributes to the scholarship on FCPA
enforcement actions by aggregating all of the publicly available data
about FCPA settlements and qualitatively describing various FCPA
cases. This Note provides a snapshot of the FCPA enforcement
landscape as it looks today rather than an empirical or statistical
study. By collecting and analyzing the publicly available information
about the DOJ's FCPA settlements over the past ten years, this Note
is able to identify emerging trends and describe helpful case studies.

Hinchey, supra note 14, at 400-01.
155.
156.
Plea Agreement at 7-9, United States v. Alliance One Tobacco Osh, No.
4:10-cr-00016 (W.D. Va. Aug. 06, 2010) [hereinafter Alliance One Tobacco Osh Plea
Agreement].
157.
See BAE Sentencing Memo, supra note 81, at 9-10 (noting that the number
of bribes was so extensive it would be impossible to calculate the total amount);
Sentencing Memorandum at 13, United States v. Siemens AG, No. 1:08-cr-00367
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Siemens Sentencing Memo] (noting that the
amount of profit derived from the bribery would be very difficult to calculate).
Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands
158.
and Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. LAW. 347, 352 (2008).
159.
Cf. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST 439-535 (2012), available at
(describing ongoing FCPA
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/fcpa-digest.pdf
investigations based on information gathered from documents filed with the SEC and
media reports).
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B. Findings
This Note aggregates the publicly available information about
FCPA settlements in two tables, which are contained in Appendix A.
Table 3 contains information about settlements in which the
corporate defendant voluntarily disclosed its criminal conduct to the
DOJ. Table 4 contains information about FCPA defendants whose
prosecution was not the result of a voluntary disclosure by the
company. These tables contain all of the publicly available
information about these settlements. Data that appears to be missing
was not included in the documents created by the DOJ and the
defendant company as part of the settlement.

IV. TRENDS AND TAKEAWAYS
While the data that can be gathered from the non-prosecution,
deferred prosecution, and plea agreements that the DOJ has entered
into since 2002 appears to create only a modest picture of DOJ
enforcement, this time period has actually been a period of robust
FCPA enforcement in comparison to the first twenty years of the
statute's existence. 160 Given this discrete data, these cases reveal the
beginning of enforcement trends, especially in cases resolved between
2008 and 2011, which provide the most complete information. While
narrowing the temporal focus further reduces the number of cases,
over two-thirds of the FCPA cases resolved by the DOJ between 2002
and 2011 were resolved between 2008 and 20 11 .161
A. Patternsin Settlements and Penalties
The corporate FCPA cases resolved between 2002 and 2011
suggest four trends in FCPA enforcement. First, many of the cases
relate to each other. The DOJ often entered into dispositions with
both a parent company and its subsidiary regarding the same
underlying conduct. 16 2 For example, in January and February 2007,
the DOJ entered into plea agreements with three subsidiaries of
Vetco International, Ltd. and into a deferred prosecution agreement
with a fourth. 163 The conduct underlying all four dispositions was the

.160.
See Koehler, supra note 7, at 389 (noting that enforcement from 1977 to
1997 was nearly nonexistent but significantly increased thereafter).
161.
See infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
162.
See infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
163.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Vetco International Ltd.
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Agree to Pay $26 Million in Criminal
Fines (Feb. 6, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/February/07crm
075.html.
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same: the defendant companies had caused bribes to be paid to
customs officials in Nigeria in exchange for preferential treatment
during the customs process. 164 In a more recent example, the DOJ
entered into a non-prosecution agreement with Alliance One, Inc. and
into plea agreements with two of its subsidiaries for bribes that had

been paid by those subsidiaries in Kyrgyzstan and Thailand. 165
Dispositions also relate to each other because they involved

similar, but unrelated, conduct by unrelated companies. Between
2007 and 2011, the DOJ reached agreements with several
corporations to resolve illegal conduct related to their participation in
the UN Oil-for-Food Program. 16 6 While none of these companies
worked together or even in the same industry, they all paid kickbacks
to the Iraqi government in order to obtain contracts to sell goods to
that government through the UN Oil-for-Food Program. 167 These
cases are related because the illegal conduct engaged in by the

companies is nearly identical, even though the companies are
unconnected.

Finally, dispositions relate when similar conduct is alleged in
multiple dispositions because the defendant companies engaged in
illegal conduct together or defendants in the same industry engaged
in similar illegal conduct. For example, Panalpina Inc., a freightforwarding company, pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA
and aiding and abetting violations of the FCPA in November 2010.168
The conduct underlying Panalpina's plea consisted of paying bribes to

164.
Id.
165.
Alliance One Tobacco Osh Plea Agreement, supra note 156; Plea
Agreement, United States v. Alliance One Int'l AG, No. 4:10-cr-00017 (W.D. Va. Aug. 6,
2010) [hereinafter Alliance One Int'l Plea Agreement].
166.
See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. York Int'l
Corp., No. 07-CR-00253 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2007) [hereinafter York Int'l Deferred
Prosecution Agreement] (agreeing to $10 million penalty for FCPA violations relating
to business conducted under the UN Oil-for-Food program); Letter from Steven A.
Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Paul Gerlach, Sidley Austin LLP,
Counsel for Novo Nordisk 2-4 (May 6, 2009) [hereinafter Novo Nordisk DPA Letter],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/nordiskn/05-06-09novoagree.pdf (imposing $9 million penalty relating to business activities conducted under
the UN Oil-for-Food Program); Letter from Paul Pelletier, Principal Deputy Chief,
Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Eric Dubelier, Reed Smith LLP, Counsel for
Johnson & Johnson 5, 13-14 (Jan. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Johnson & Johnson DPA
Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-08Ildepuy-dpa.pdf (imposing fine of $21.4 million for payments to the Iraqi government
under the program); infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
167.
See, e.g., Novo Nordisk DPA Letter, supra note 166, at 15-17 ("From in or
about January 2001 through in or about April 2003, Novo obtained and performed
approximately £22 million worth of contracts to supply insulin and other medicines
pursuant to the OFFP with the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances
('Kimadia'), a state-owned company which was part of the Ministry of Health of the
government of Iraq.").
168.
Plea Agreement, United States v. Panalpina, Inc. at 1, No. 10-cr-765 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Panalpina Plea Agreement].
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Nigerian customs officials on behalf of its customers in order to
circumvent local rules and regulations about the import of goods and
materials. 169 At the same time, five oil and gas services companies
who used Panalpina's services also entered into agreements with the
DOJ to resolve investigations of violations of the FCPA,170 and a sixth
171
company settled with the DOJ approximately nine months later.
defendant companies
These cases were related because the
172
together.
conduct
illegal
the
in
participated
The second trend to emerge is that nearly all non-prosecution
agreements entered into by the DOJ between 2002 and the presentand all non-prosecution agreements after 2007-involved a company
that had voluntarily disclosed a potential violation of the FCPA and
cooperated in the subsequent investigation. 173 This is significant
because, as described in Part II.B.3, a non-prosecution agreement is
the least harsh disposition a company can enter into and carries less
of a stigma than either a plea or a deferred prosecution agreement,
causing fewer collateral consequences for the company. 174 While
several companies that disclosed illegal conduct voluntarily also
entered into deferred prosecution and plea agreements, 175 this trend
suggests that only companies that voluntarily disclose will receive
non-prosecution agreements. Failing to disclose illegal conduct may
foreclose the possibility that a company who violates the FCPA could
receive a non-prosecution agreement.
Third, most of the companies that received penalties below the
fine range prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines voluntarily
disclosed their discovery of potential illegal conduct. Data about the
prescribed fine range was available for twenty-two of the companies
that voluntarily disclosed illegal conduct. 176 Nine of those companies
received penalties that were less than the minimum fine
recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. 7 7 However, some
companies that voluntarily disclosed did not receive penalties reduced
below the applicable Guidelines range, 178 and other companies

Id. at 3.
169.
170.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Oil Services and a Freight Forwarding
Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than $156
Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html.
JGC Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 4, at 1.
171.
172.
Id.
See infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
173.
See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the three primary vehicles for
174.
enforcement).
175.
See, e.g., Daimler AG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22; CCI
Plea Agreement, supra note 33.
176.
Infra Appendix A, Table 3.
Infra Appendix A, Table 3.
177.
See, e.g., ABB Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 91 (receiving a
178.
penalty within the Guidelines range despite having self-disclosed).
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received reduced sentences even though their conduct was uncovered
by an investigation. 179 But five of the eight companies that received a
penalty reduced by more than 30 percent below the recommended
Guidelines range disclosed FCPA violations voluntarily.1 80 The three
companies that did not voluntarily disclose-Innospec, Siemens, and
Bridgestone Corporation-received reduced penalties due to
extenuating circumstances (Innospec) 8 1 and "exemplary" or
"extraordinary"
cooperation
(Siemens
and
Bridgestone
Corporation). 182
Defendant
Innospec Inc.
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Pride International, Inc.
Latin Node, Inc.
Daimler
ABB Inc.
Bridgestone Corporation
Control Components, Inc.

Date of
Settlement
3/17/10
12/12/08
11/14/10
3/23/09
3/22/10
9/29/10
10/5/11
7/22/09

Reduction
in Fine
86.11%
66.67%
55%
52.38%
48.52%
40%
37.34%
34.77%

Table 1183

Finally, the DOJ is rewarding companies that provide significant
cooperation after an FCPA violation is discovered, especially if the
company did not self-disclose. For example, Bridgestone Corporation
received a penalty 37.34 percent below the base fine, despite not selfdisclosing, because its cooperation was "extraordinary, including
conducting an extensive worldwide internal investigation, voluntarily
making Japanese and other employees available for interviews, and
collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and
information for the United States. '18 4 Other reductions in penalties
for FCPA violations have been attributed to the cooperation provided
by the defendant corporation after the violation was brought to the
18 5
DOJ's attention.

179.
See, e.g., Siemens Sentencing Memo, supra note 157, at 18 (receiving a
penalty below the Guidelines range despite not self-disclosing).
180. Infra Appendix A, Table 3.
181.
See infra Part IV.B.3 (describing the Innospec case).
182.
See Siemens Sentencing Memo, supra note 157, at 18 (attributing the
reduced sentence to Siemens's exemplary cooperation in the investigation); Plea
Agreement at 17, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 4:110cr-00651 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
5, 2011) [hereinafter Bridgestone Plea Agreement] (attributing the reduced sentence to
Bridgestone's extraordinary cooperation).
183.
Infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
184.
Bridgestone Plea Agreement, supranote 182, at 17.
185.
See, e.g., Magyar Telekom Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22,
at 8; Johnson & Johnson DPA Letter, supra note 166, at 5.
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While the data available about the small number of FCPA
settlements since 2002 does not lend itself to statistical analysis, a
survey of the settlements resulting from voluntary disclosures and
investigations does reveal several trends. Settlements are related,
even when the defendants themselves are unconnected. Nonprosecution agreements are primarily used with defendants that have
disclosed, and failing to disclose may foreclose this option. Defendants
that voluntarily disclose illegal conduct tend to get penalties that
were reduced from the Sentencing Guidelines' minimum to a greater
degree. Finally, cooperation with the DOJ is rewarded, especially if
the company did not self-disclose.
B. Case Studies
While no two FCPA cases are exactly alike, past FCPA
settlements can be instructive as to how future cases will be resolved.
This Note provides a more complete picture of the DOJ's enforcement
efforts in the FCPA arena by qualitatively examining three recent
cases.
1.

Panalpina,Inc. and Five Oil Services Companies: The Early Bird
Gets the Worm

The first case study involves six companies that engaged in
similar illegal conduct that was, in many instances, related. On
November 4, 2010, Panalpina World Transport, a freight forwarding
company, and five companies in the oil services industry resolved
investigations of FCPA violations and agreed to collectively pay a
total of $156,565,000 in criminal penalties.' 8 6 The conduct underlying
all of these dispositions involved paying bribes to government officials
in foreign countries in order to avoid paying customs duties and
penalties relating to equipment that the oil services companies
brought into the foreign countries for their operations there. 18 7 The
oil services companies paid these bribes directly and through their
agents or Panalpina, which made improper payments on behalf of its
customers.1 8 8 While all of the companies involved paid fines to resolve
these investigations, the fines varied widely in amount and in their
relation to the recommended fine range from the Guidelines. The
companies involved in this conduct received the following fines:

186.
187.
188.

Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 170.
Id.
Id.
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Disposition

Voluntary
Disclosure

Fine
Amount (in
millions)

Deviation
from
Guidelines
Range

Panalpina World
Transport

Plea

NO

$70.56

-3.98%

Shell Nigeria

DPA

NO

$30

-12.28%

Company

Exploration and
Production
Company, Ltd.
Transocean, Inc.

DPA

NO

$13.44

-20%

Tidewater Marine

DPA

YES

$7.35

-30%

DPA

YES

$32.625

-55%

YES

$2.59

N/A

International, Inc.
Pride
International, Inc.
Noble Corporation

NPA

9
Table 218

While the DOJ considers many factors when calculating an
FCPA penalty using the Sentencing Guidelines and subsequently
selecting a specific amount within the prescribed range of fines, 190 the
story provided in the agreements between corporate defendants and
the DOJ about the defendants' disclosure (or lack thereof) and
subsequent cooperation with the investigation may explain why a
given fine amount was ultimately selected.
Though three of these companies voluntarily disclosed
potentially criminal conduct to the DOJ, they did not all disclose at
the same time or for the same reasons. According to the Statement of
Facts included in the deferred prosecution agreement between Pride
International and the DOJ, Pride discovered evidence of improper
payments in 2006 during the course of a continuing internal review,
undertook an internal investigation, and voluntarily disclosed the
FCPA violations to the DOJ.191 The conduct for which Pride
acknowledged responsibility took place during 2003 through 2004 in
Venezuela, India, and Mexico, 192 so this conduct may have ceased by
the time it was discovered, and the DOJ noted in its press release
about this settlement that "Pride provided information and
'193
substantially assisted in the investigation of Panalpina.'

189.
Infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
190.
Hinchey, supra note 14, at 407 n.73.
191.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at B-15, United States v. Pride Int'l, No.
4:10-cr-00766 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Pride Deferred Prosecution
Agreement].
192.
Id. at B-1.
193.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 170.
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Tidewater Marine International also voluntarily disclosed,
although there is no specific mention of the disclosure or when it
occurred in the Statement of Facts accompanying the deferred
prosecution agreement between Tidewater and the DOJ. The
agreement mentions, under "Relevant Considerations," that
Tidewater "promptly commenced an internal investigation.. . after
becoming aware of information indicating potential issues with its
Freight Forwarding Agent [Panalpina]" and voluntarily disclosed the
conduct underlying the deferred prosecution agreement to the
DOJ. 194 In addition, Tidewater admitted to paying bribes through its
freight forwarding company as late as 2007.195
The third company to voluntarily disclose FCPA violations,
Noble Corporation, initiated an internal investigation in May 2007
after learning that a competitor had begun an internal investigation
of its import process in Nigeria. 196 According to the non-prosecution
agreement between Noble and the DOJ, Noble immediately retained
outside counsel to review their operations in Nigeria and told the
DOJ about its investigation a month later, in June 2007.197 In
addition, the DOJ specifically mentioned in the press release about
these settlements that the "non-prosecution agreement recognizes
Noble's early voluntary disclosure. '"198
The three other companies that settled because of their
participation in this conduct did not disclose their FCPA violations to
the DOJ, although they did subsequently cooperate in the DOJ's
investigation. Transocean promptly began an internal investigation
after becoming aware of information showing problems with their
freight forwarding company and cooperated with the DOJ's
investigation. 199 Royal Dutch Shell also cooperated with the DOJ's
investigation. 20 0 Finally, Panalpina World Transport received a small
reduction in its penalty, but the DOJ filed a motion for downward
departure because of Panalpina's "exemplary cooperation" and

194.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4, United States v. Tidewater Marine
Int'l, No. 4:10-cr-00770 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Tidewater Deferred
Prosecution Agreement].
Id. at B-23.
195.
196.
Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Marc Spearing, Baker Botts LLP, Counsel for Noble Corp. app. A at A15 (Nov. 4,
2010) [hereinafter Noble Corp. NPA Letter] (outlining the agreed upon details of the
non-prosecution agreement).
197.
Id.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 170.
198.
199.
Transocean Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 143, at 4.
200.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4, United States v. Shell Nigeria
Exploration and Prod. Co. Ltd., No. 4:10-cr-00767 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter
SNEPCO Deferred Prosecution Agreement].
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"comprehensive" internal investigation that provided information
20 1
about third parties who had participated in the bribe scheme.
While five of the companies involved in this scheme received
fines that were below the Guidelines minimum, those who received
the largest reductions voluntarily disclosed their misconduct to the
DOJ. The Guidelines calculation with respect to Noble Corporation
was not provided, so it is not known whether the fine Noble received
was less than the minimum suggested by the Guidelines. However,
the fact that Noble received a non-prosecution agreement-unlike any
of the other companies-and had to pay a fine that was significantly
lower than that imposed on any other company, implies that the DOJ
did take Noble's voluntary disclosure into account. In addition, the
evidence provided in the agreements between Pride, Tidewater, and
the DOJ implies that Pride, which received a 55 percent reduction,
may have been more forthcoming and cooperative than Tidewater,
which received a 30 percent reduction. While this case does not show
definitively that the DOJ rewards companies that self-disclose, it at
least suggests the inference that the DOJ takes seriously voluntary
disclosure and genuine cooperation undertaken by FCPA defendants.
2.

Control Components, Inc.: Criminals Among Us

Control Components, Inc. (CCI), a California company that
pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA in July 2007,202 stands out for
the high number of former employees who have been prosecuted for
violations of the FCPA. CCI manufactures service control valves that
are used in the power generation industry and made approximately
236 improper payments in thirty-six different countries between 1998
and 2007.203 CCI's senior management instructed its salespeople to
cultivate "friends-in-camp" who were employed by the state-owned
businesses with which CCI did business. 20 4 These friends-in-camp
usually had the power to award contracts to CCI or to dictate the
technical specifications of an order so that CCI would be the favored
bidder. 20 5 In exchange for helping CCI win a contract, the friend-incamp would receive a corrupt payment. 20 6 In all, CCI made
$6,854,763 worth of improper payments that resulted in $46,526,294
20 7
worth of net profits.

201.
Government's Motion for Downward Departure, United States v.
Panalpina, Inc., at 4, No. 10-cr-765 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2010).
202.
Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 5-6, United States v. Control
Components, Inc., No. 8:09-cr-00162 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2009) [hereinafter CCI
Sentencing Memo].
203.
Id. at 4.
204.
Id.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
Id. at 5.
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The Sentencing Memorandum that the DOJ filed in conjunction
with CCI's plea agreement highlights the assistance that CCI
provided. 208 The DOJ first noted that CCI voluntarily disclosed to the
DOJ that information had come to light suggesting that CCI had
made corrupt payments in connection with sales orders. 20 9 The
Sentencing Memorandum also highlights that CCI's cooperation
"substantially assisted" the DOJ in prosecuting CCI employees.2 10
Both the former director of worldwide factory sales and the former
finance director pleaded guilty in 2009 to conspiracy to violate the
FCPA, and both agreed to cooperate with the ongoing
investigation. 211 Six more former senior CCI executives, including the
former CEO and the second-highest ranking executive at the
2 12
company, were also indicted for FCPA and Travel Act violations.
The Sentencing Memorandum also notes CCI's "extensive" remedial
efforts. 2 13 "CCI's internal investigation and uncovering of the
extensive criminal conduct led to the termination or resignation of 31
employees, including its entire Middle East sales team and over half
of its finance department. '2 14 Finally, CCI reviewed all of its agency
215
relationships and terminated thirty-five of them.
As a result of pleading guilty, CCI agreed to pay an $18.2 million
penalty, which is 34.77 percent below the minimum fine
by the Sentencing Guidelines. 216 The DOJ
recommended
acknowledged this reduction in the Sentencing Memorandum, stating
that "the factors mentioned ... in this memorandum represent
mitigating circumstances of a 'kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the United States Sentencing
Commission."' 217 While the government considered CCI's voluntary
disclosure, the emphasis in the Sentencing Memorandum on
individual prosecutions and CCI's remedial actions implies that the
DOJ also based the reduction in CCI's penalty, at least in part, on
CCI's assistance in holding individual employees accountable for
criminal conduct.
3.

Innospec, Inc.: The Economy Has Got You Down

Innospec, Inc., the world's only manufacturer of the gasoline
additive tetraethyl lead (TEL), received the largest reduction in

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 8.

213.

Id. at 10.

214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id. at 11.
Infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
CCI Sentencing Memo, supra note 202, at 8.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
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penalty of any company to resolve an FCPA case between 2002 and
2011.218 In its deferred prosecution agreement, Innospec admitted to
paying kickbacks to the Iraqi government in connection with the UN
Oil-for-Food Program; paying bribes to Iraqi officials after the Oil-forFood Program; bribing Indonesian officials to secure contracts to sell
TEL; and trading with Cuba. 2 19 The DOJ ultimately imposed a fine
86.11 percent below the minimum fine recommended by the
Sentencing Guidelines.
Innospec did not voluntarily disclose its illegal conduct to the
DOJ, and according to the Sentencing Memorandum filed with the
court in this case, "Innospec's cooperation here was not timely, nor
was it initially thorough. '220 Despite this, the DOJ drastically
reduced Innospec's imposed penalty because of Innospec's inability to
pay a significant fine and the penalties to be paid to other
enforcement agencies. 221 The DOJ noted that the Guidelines allow a
penalty below the range if the reduction is necessary to avoid
"substantially jeopardizing
the continued
viability of the
'222
A $101.5 million fine, the minimum prescribed by
organization.
the Guidelines, would jeopardize Innospec's continued viability
because, among other things, its pension fund would experience a $85
million shortfall; it would be unable to remediate environmental
damage it had caused; and it would be forced to close facilities around
the world, resulting in dozens of employees losing their jobs. 2 23 The
Sentencing Memorandum also notes that three other agencies-the
SEC, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and the United Kingdom's
Serious Fraud Office-sought penalties from Innospec for this
conduct. 224 As a result of these considerations, the DOJ reduced
Innospec's fine to $14.1 million and included payment plans for both
fixed and contingent payments. 225 Innospec is the only company since
2002 to receive a reduced penalty for this reason or any other reason
2 26
not related to disclosure or cooperation.

218.
Infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
219.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Innospec Inc. Pleads Guilty to FCPA
Charges and Defrauding the United Nations; Admits to Violating the U.S. Embargo
Against Cuba (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
March/iO-crm-278.html.
220.
Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 19, United States v. Innospec
Inc., No. 1:10-cr-00061 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Innospec Sentencing
Memo].
221.
Id. at 13-16.
222.
Id. at 13.
223.
Id. at 13.
224.
Id. at 16-17.
225.
Id. at 14-15.
226.
See infra Appendix A, Tables 3 & 4.
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V. CONCLUSION

While the FCPA settlements entered into by the DOJ since 2002
do not have the predictive power of an explicit DOJ policy or
sentencing formula, they do suggest that self-disclosure and
cooperation are valuable. The DOJ is successfully prosecuting related
cases, suggesting that all companies whose misconduct is similar or
intertwined-not just the forthcoming-will be prosecuted under the
FCPA. For the companies that were prosecuted during the last
decade, not disclosing wrongdoing seemingly foreclosed the option of a
non-prosecution agreement and the greatest reductions in sentences.
Significant cooperation can help to mitigate a potential penalty, but
that also is an expense.
Ultimately, self-disclosure is almost certainly valuable,
particularly for a company that thinks its misdeeds are likely to be
discovered. While a company's likelihood of being caught is factdependent and beyond the scope of this Note, companies should base
their decisions to disclose largely on that. If a company's conduct is
likely to be discovered-because it is similar or intertwined with that
of another company or will need to be reported under SarbanesOxley-the value of self-disclosure is the possibility of a nonprosecution agreement and the ability to argue for the greatest
possible fine reduction. While these findings may not satisfy the
practitioners and scholars who believe the DOJ is not living up to its
promise to reward companies that voluntarily disclose criminal
conduct, the data analyzed in this Note indicates that at least for
some corporate defendants, self-disclosure has value.
Sarah Marberg*

* J.D. Candidate 2012, Vanderbilt University Law School. Many thanks to the
editors and staff of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law for their editing
assistance.
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Appendix A
Table 3: Settlements Involvin
Company

Date

Fine
(in
millions)

Range
(in
millions)

Voluntar

Deviation
from
Guidelines
Range

Disposition

Disclosures
Profits
(in
millions)

NPA

Deutsche Telekom

12/29/11

$4.36

AG
Magyar Telekom,
2 28
Plc.

12/29/11

$59.6

Aon

12/20/11

$1.764

NPA

$1,8402

Armor Holdings,
230
Inc.

07/13/11

$10.29

NPA

$1

Tenaris S.A.231
Johnson and
Johnson
23 2
(Depuy)
Comverse
Technology,
23 3
Inc.

05/17/11
04/08/11

$3.5
$21.4

NPA

$0.4786

04/06/11

$1.2

Tyson Foods,

02/10/11

$4

$5.04$10.08

-20.63%

DPA

01/31/11

$8

$10.5$20

-23.81%

DPA

12/10/10
11/04/10

$1.7

NPA

2.59

NPA

22 7

Corporation

2 29

2 34

Inc.
Maxwell
Technologies,
Inc.

$72.5$145

$28.5$57

-17.79%

-24.91%

DPA

236

Over $0.2

DPA

NPA

2 35

RAE Systems
Noble

Bribes
(in
millions)

$1.25 in
adjusted
operating
income
$0.88

$0.536

Benefit
received of
$2.5-$7

$2.7891

$0.35

2 37

Corporation

Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
227.
to Mary Jo White & Jonathan R. Tuttle, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Counsels for
Deutsche Telekom AG 2 (Dec. 9, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/deutsche-telekom/2011-12-29-deustche-telekom-npa.pdf.
Magyar Telekom Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22, at 8.
228.
Letter from Denis J. Mclnerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
229.
to Laurence A. Urgenson & Craig S. Primis, Kirkland & Ellis, Counsels for Aon
Corporation 2 (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/aonI2011-12-20.aon-final-executed-npa.pdf.
Letter from Denis J. Mclnerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
230.
to Roger M. Witten & Kimberly Parker, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr,
Counsels for Armor Holdings, Inc. app. A at 2 (July 13, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraudlfcpa/cases/armor/07-3- 1larmor-holdings.pdf.
Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
231.
to Robert J. Giuffra, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Counsel for Tenaris S.A. app. A at A2
(Mar. 14, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminallfraud/fcpa/cases/tenarissa/2011-03-14-tenaris.pdf.
Johnson & Johnson DPA Letter, supra note 166, at 2.
232.
Comverse Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 29, app. A at 7.
233.
234.
Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Laurence Urgenson, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Counsel for Tyson Foods, Inc. at 4-5, 17
(Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpalcases/tysonfoods/02- 10-1ltyson-foods-dpa.pdf.
Maxwell Techs. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22, at 6-7, 23.
235.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, RAE Systems Agrees to Pay $1.7
236.
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/December/10-crm1428.html.
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Date

Fine
(in
millions)

Range
(in
millions)

Pride
International,
23
Inc. 8

11/04/10

$32.625

$72.5$145

Tidewater Marine
International,

11/04/10

$7.35

$10.5$21

09/29/10

$17.1

09/29/10

$1.9

$28.5$57
$1.92$3.2

08/06/10

$4.2

Company

Inc.

239

I

ABB Inc.

2 40

ABB Ltd. -

2 42

Tobacco Osh
Alliance One
International,
243
lnc.

Disposition

-30%

DPA

$4.2$8.4

-40%

Plea

-1.04%

DPA

0%

Plea

245

$5.25

$4.2$8.4

25%

Plea

08/06/10
$4.4

$6.3$12.6

-30%

Plea

03/22/10

$93.6

$192.9$385.8

-48.52%

DPA

UTStarcom
Inc.248

12/31/09

$1.5

Helmerich &
24 9
Payne Inc.

09/30/09

DaimlerAG

246

2 47

$2.9678

$7

$1.2391

$2.3729

$0.6978

NPA

08/06/10

Tabacos Ltda.

$4.8

NPA

08/06/10

Corporation
Universal Leaf

Bribes
(in
millions)

DPA

08/06/10

Alliance One
International
2 44
AG
Universal

Profits
(in
millions)

I

24 1

Jordan
Alliance One

Deviation
from
Guidelines
Range
-55%

NPA

$1
I

$7

NPA
$0.204

$0.173

I

237.
Noble Corp. NPA Letter, supranote 196, at 3.
238.
Pride Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 191, at 10.
239.
Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 194, at 10-11.
240.
Plea Agreement at 12, United States v. ABB Inc., No. 4:10-CR-664 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 29, 2010).
241.
ABB Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 91, at 11-12.
242.
Alliance One Tobacco Osh Plea Agreement, supra note 156, at 9-10.
243.
Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Edward J. Fuhr, Hunton & Williams LLP, Counsel for Alliance One Int'l (Aug. 6,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-0610alliance-one-npa.pdf.
244.
Alliance One Int'l Plea Agreement, supra note 165, at 8-9.
245.
Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Patrick R. Hanes, Williams Mullen, Counsel for Universal Corp. 2 (Aug. 6, 2010),
available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/universal-corp/08-0310universal-corp-npa.pdf.
246.
Plea Agreement at 9, United States v. Universal Leaf Tabacos Ltda., No.
3:10-CR-00225-REP (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2010).
247.
Daimler AG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22, at 6-7.
248.
Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Leo Cunningham, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Counsel for UTStarcom, Inc. 2
(Dec. 31, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
utstarcom-inc/12-31-09utstarcom-agree.pdf.
249.
Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Kimberly A. Parker, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Counsel for Helmerich
& Payne, Inc. 2 (July 30, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/helmerich-payne/06-29-09helmerich-agree.pdf.
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Deviation
from
Guidelines
Range
-34.77%

Disposition

Profits
(in
millions)

Bribes
(in
millions)

Plea

$46.5

$6.85

-52.38%

Plea

100%
(Maximum
fine

Plea

Date

Fine
(in
millions)

Range
(in
millions)

07/22109

$18.2

$27.9$55.8

Inc.
Latin Node,
25 1
Inc.

03/23/09

$2

$4.2-

Aibel Group

11/21/08

$4.2

$8.4
$2.1$4.2

06/05/08

$1.1

NPA

$1.4

06/03/08

$2

DPA

$13.5

05/04/08

$22

DPA

02/14/08

$0.3

NPA

10/01/07

$10

DPA

09/24/07
04/11/07

$11

$19$38

01/05/07

$6

$4.2$8.4

Company

Control
Components,
25 0

Ltd.

2 52

Faro
Technologies,

$2.2505

$0.4445

2 53

Inc.
AGA Medical
2 54

Corporation
Willbros Group,
2 55

Inc.
Westinghouse Air
Brake
Technologies
25 6

Corporation
York
International
Corporation

2 57

Paradigm B.V.
Baker Hughes
Services
International,
Inc.

2 58

$10.7

$1.224

$19

$4.1

I
NPA

$1

Plea

2 59

Vetco Gray
Controls Inc. et
a1260

I

.I

I

$2.1

Plea

42.86%
I

1

1

CCI Plea Agreement, supra note 33, at 11.
250.
Plea Agreement at 5-8, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 09-CR251.
20239-PCH (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2009).
252.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Aibel Group Ltd. Pleads Guilty to
Foreign Bribery and Agrees to Pay $4.2 Million in Criminal Fines (Nov. 21, 2008),
availableat http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-crm- 1041.html.
Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
253.
Gregory S. Bruch, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Counsel for Faro Techs. 3 (June 5,
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal]fraud/fcpa/cases/faro-tech-inc/06-0308faro-agree.pdf.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v. AGA Med. Corp.,
254.
No. 08-CR-172-JMR (D. Minn. June 3, 2008).
255.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. Willbros Grp., Inc.,
No. 08-CR-287 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008).
Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
256.
Eric A. Dubelier, Reed Smith LLP, Counsel for Westinghouse Air Brake Techs., Inc. 2
(Feb. 8, 2008).
York Int'l Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 166, at 2.
257.
Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
258.
Saul M. Pilchen, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Counsel for Paradigm B.V.
(Sept. 21, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
paradignm09-21-07paradigm-agree.pdf.
259.
Plea Agreement at 8-12, United States v. Baker Hughes Servs. Int'l, Inc.,
No. 07-CR-129 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2007).
260.
Plea Agreement at 7-10, United States v. Vetco Gray Controls Inc., No. 07CR-004 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2007).
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Company

Date

Fine
(in
millions)

Range
(in
millions)

Vetco Gray
Controls
26 1
Limited
Vetco Gray UK
26 2
Limited

01/05/07

$8

$6.3$12.6

01/05/07

$12

$12.6$25.2

Aibel Group

01/05/07

$0

DPA

10/16/06

$0

DPA

10/10/06

$7.5

Plea

05/20/05

$2

Plea

03/01/05

$13

02/28/05

$0.45

NPA

$0.105

01/06/05

$1

DPA

$0.05

12/03/04

$0.8

NPA

06/22/04

$5.25

$3.5673$7.1347

47.17%

Plea

$5.9456

06/22/04

$5.25

$3.5673$7.1347

47.17%

Plea

$5.9456

12/05/02

$2

Ltd.263
Schnitzer Steel
26 4
Industries
SSI International
265
Far East Ltd.
DPC (Tianjin) Co.
26 6
Ltd.
Titan
Corporation267
Micrus
26 8

Corporation
Monsanto
2 69

Company
InVision
Technologies,

Inc.

$6.825$13.65

Deviation
from
Guidelines
Range
26.98%

Disposition

Plea

$2.1

-4.76%

Plea

$2.1

90.48%/
4.76% below
maximum

Plea

Profits
(in
millions)

Bribes
(in
millions)

$1.6
Between
$2.5 and $7

Over $2

2 70

ABB Vetco Gray
27 1

UK Ltd.
ABB Vetco Gray
2 72

Inc., et a1
Syncor Taiwan,
lnc.273

Plea

261.
Id.
262.
Id.
263.
Plea Agreement at 7-9, United States v. Aibel Grp. Ltd., No. 07-CR-005
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2008).
264.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Schnitzer Steel Indus.,
No. 06-CR-398 (D. Or. Oct. 16, 2006).
265.
Plea Agreement at 3-4, United States v. SSI Int'l Far E. Ltd., No. 06-CR398 (D. Or. Oct. 10, 2006).
266.
Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd., No. 05-CR482 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2005).
267.
Plea Agreement at 6-13, 25, United States v. Titan Corp., No. 05-CR-314BEN (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005).
268.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Micrus Corporation Enters into
Agreement to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Liability (Mar. 2, 2005), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/March/05_crm-090.htm.
269.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. Monsanto Co., No.
05-CR-008-ESH (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2005).
270.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, InVision Technologies Enters into
Agreement with the United States (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_780.htm.
271.
Plea Agreement at 7-11, ABB Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 04-CR-279 (S.D. Tex.
July 6, 2004).
272.
Id.
273.
Syncor Plea Agreement, supra note 78, at 6-8.
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Table 4: Settlements Not Involvin
Company

Date

Bridgestone
Corporation
JGC
Corporation

Fine
(in

Range
(in

Disposition

Profits
(in

Bribes
(in

millions)

millions)

millions)

millions)

$28

$39.9$79.8

-37.34

Plea

$17.1037

04/06/11

$218.8

$312.6$625.2

-30%

DPA

$92

$86.58-

6.26%

DPA

Contracts
worth
$6,000
$48.1

275
2 76

Vountay Disclosure

Variance

10/05/11
274

Alcatel.Lucent
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12/27/10

S~~~$173.106______

Alcatel-Lucent

12/27/10

2 77

France
Panalpina World

$1.5

Plea

I
11/04/10

$70.56

$72.8$145.6

-3.98%

Plea

11/04/10

$30

$34.2$68.4

-12.28%

DPA

11/04/10

$13.44

$16.8$33.6

-20%

DPA

07/07/10

$240

$300$600

-20%

DPA

Contracts
worth
$6,000

$180

06/28/10

$240.

$318.4$636.8

-25%

DPA

Contracts
worth

$182

03117/10

$14.1

-86.11%

Plea

BAE Systems
2 84
plc

02/04/10

$400

$101.5$203
$360-$400

11%
Maximum

Plea

AGCO

278

Transport
Shell Nigeria
Exploration and
Production
Company,

$49

2 79

Ltd.
Transocean
2 80

Inc.
Snamprogetti
Netherlands
B.V

28 1

Technip S.A

2 82

Innospec Inc.

283

$6,000

09/30/09

$1.6

DPA

Limited
Novo Nordisk
28 6

05/11/09

$9

DPA

Kellogg Brown &

02/06/09

$402

12/22108

$7

2 85

$200

Over $200
$0.5532

A/S

2 87

Root LLC
Fiat

28 8

$376.8$753.6

6.69%

Plea

235 5

DPA

E46.1

$4.358

274.
Bridgestone Plea Agreement, supra note 182, at 14-18,.
275.
JGC Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 4, at 7, 10.
276.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.,
No. 10-CR-20907-PAS (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2010).
277.
See Plea Agreement at 8, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent Fr., S.A., No. 10CR-20906-PAS (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2010) (applying the statutory maximum rather than
the Alternative Fines Act to determine the penalty because calculating the fine under
the Alternative Fines Act would be too cumbersome).
278.
Panalpina Plea Agreement, supra note 168, at 14-15.
279.
SNEPCO Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 200, at 4.
280.
Transocean Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 143, at 22.
281.
Snamprogetti Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, at 34-35.
282.
Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, at 40-41.
283.
Innospec Sentencing Memo, supra note 220, at 19.
284.
BAE Sentencing Memo, supra note 81, at 16.
285.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, United States v. AGCO Ltd., No. 09CR-249-RJL (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2009).
286.
Novo Nordisk DPA Letter, supra note 166, at 2.
287.
KBR Information, supra note 28, 9-18.
288.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, United States v. Fiat S.P.A., No. 08CV-0221 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2008).
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Company

Date

Siemens
Aktiengesellchaf
,289

12/12/08

$450

Volvo
Construction
Equipment,
2 90
AB

03/20/08

$7

03/20/08
02/21/08

$4

DPA

12/21/07

$1

NPA

12/20/07

$0

NPA

10/31/07

$2.5

DPA

08/23/07

$1.15

NPA

10/13/06

$7.5

DPA

Fine
(in

Range
(in

Variance

Disposition

-66.67%

Plea/DPA

Profits
(in
millions)
$843.5

Bribes
(in
millions)
$805.5

DPA

$13.8

$1.3

DPA

C61

milmillionsillions)

29 1

Renault
Flowserve
29 2
Pompes SAS
Lucent
Technologies,

$1,350$2.700

$4.8
$0.6047

2 93

Inc

Akzo Nobel
N.V.294
Ingersoll-Rand

Italian SpA

29 5

Textron Inc.
Statoil, ASA

296
29 7

$0.6

$5

289.
Siemens Sentencing Memo, supra note 157, at 13.
290.
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